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Résumé. – Dans les années 1970, Thomas C. Schelling a proposé un modèle 
pour expliquer le lien entre ségrégation spatiale et préférences individuelles concer-
nant cette ségrégation. Au moyen de simulations, il cherche à montrer qu’un haut 
niveau de ségrégation globale peut être le résultat collectif de décisions individuelles 
qui sont loin de viser une telle ségrégation. Cet article montre cependant que les 
contraintes structurelles du modèle expliquent intégralement les niveaux de ségréga-
tion atteints. Une faible exigence individuelle pour s’entourer de voisins identiques 
conduit à une ségrégation collective faible et une exigence forte conduit à une ségré-
gation forte. Les niveaux de ségrégation correspondant à un seuil donné de satisfac-
tion individuelle n’ont rien de surprenant en regard du hasard et de ce que chaque 
individu souhaite réellement. Le modèle de Schelling ne permet pas de conclure que, 
de manière générale, de larges ghettos naissent d’innocentes décisions.
Mots-clés. – Entropie ; Modèle dynamique ; Ségrégation spatiale ; Simulation 
« multiagents ».
Abstract. – In the 1970s, Thomas C. Schelling proposed a model which 
claimed to show that a high degree of spatial segregation can result from individual 
preferences which do not in themselves aim to achieve such a degree of collec-
tive segregation. However, the present paper demonstrates that this model contains 
several structural constraints which totally explain the obtained levels of segregation. 
A real weak individual demand for similar neighbours leads to low social segrega-
tion and a strong demand leads to high segregation. The levels of entropy that are 
globally achieved for a given threshold of individual satisfaction are not at all surpris-
ing in relation to the laws of chance and to what each individual actually wishes. 
The Schelling model does not allow to conclude that, in general, large ghettos are 
resulting from innocent decisions.
Key words. – Spatial segregation; Agent-based simulation; Entropy; Dynamic 
model.
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In the 1970s, Thomas C. Schelling (1971, 1978) proposed a model 
to explain the link between individual preferences about one’s neigh-
bours and spatial segregation. This model has the advantage of being 
quite simple as all that is required to implement it is a classification of 
a population into two distinct groups and some information about the 
proportion of individuals from the other group that individuals are 
willing to accept in their local environment. We can imagine a large 
number of applications (Ruoff & Schneider, 2006), but it is indubitably 
its application to the urban environment which is responsible for the 
model’s fame. One has to admit that its principal conclusion is striking. 
On the basis of simulations, Schelling showed that a very high degree 
of segregation can be the collective outcome of individual decisions 
which in themselves do not aim to achieve the aforesaid segregation. 
There appears to be a « perverse » or system effect: even if individuals 
are quite tolerant about the make-up of their neighbourhood, a high 
degree of urban segregation occurs independently of other parameters 
such as the price of housing or income levels.
In the first version of the model published in 1971, Schelling 
was fully aware that this segregationist dynamic was not the only 
explanation. Segregation is also, and perhaps primarily, explained by 
action that favours it. Such action may be organized and intentional, 
legal or illegal, coercive or more indirect, subtle or blatant, open or 
concealed, etc. Segregation is also the outcome of economic and 
social factors. For example, it is quite well-known that the wealthiest 
individuals do not live in the same districts as the poorest or that the 
most educated individuals do not mix with the least educated, and 
so on and so forth. Schelling was nevertheless convinced that segre-
gation must still be explained by a less visible mechanism which he 
compared to an evolutionary process or the operation of an « unseen 
hand » (Schelling, 1971: 146). In this regard, he was careful to distin-
guish the dynamic aspect of his model, which is its original feature, 
from the static factors that cannot be ignored. Schelling thus quite 
rightly stressed that if everyone wants his or her group to represent 
the majority in his or her neighbourhood, the only possible overall 
solution is complete segregation. More generally still, he stressed that 
collective demands with regard to one’s neighbours can generate 
structural constraints which make mixtures highly unlikely or even 
impossible1. However, even though these static constraints obviously 
1. Likewise, if we generalize the constraint to a multicultural society, as several
authors are doing today (Clark & Fossett, 2008; Fossett, 2006 ; Macy & van de Rijt, 2006), 
we must not lose sight of the fact that if everyone wants to live in a district in which his 
or her ethnic group is over-represented, coexistence is impossible.
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play a role, they are not Schelling’s focus: « The simple mathematics 
of ratios and mixtures tells us something about what outcomes are 
logically possible, but tells us little about the behavior that leads to, 
or that leads away from, particular outcomes » (Schelling, 1971: 147). 
Schelling is thus principally concerned with the dynamic at work. 
This paper will, on the contrary, examine these static constraints in 
order to assess their impact.
Although Schelling proposed several dynamic models, the 
two-dimensional spatial model – as it was presented in 1978 and 
which we shall consider here – remains the most well-known. If 
we conduct the simulation that Schelling proposes, the result he 
claims is undeniably produced. However, if we examine it closely, we 
are forced to conclude that the usual interpretation of this result is 
distorted by the failure to take proper account of certain structural 
aspects. Even if, as we stated above, Schelling mentioned structural 
constraints, the role they play in the final explanation has never been 
evaluated. And yet the fact that the individual preferences Schelling 
considers make mixtures unlikely or almost impossible irrespective of 
the dynamic should, on the contrary, lead us to ask very direct questions 
about the generality of the model.
Nonetheless, this is not the only concern. Schelling takes the 
view that the only possible explanation for the results of his model is 
that an evolutionary process is taking place. He does not merely state 
that individual actions may, by aggregation, produce an undesired 
collective effect, but he goes further, claiming that the undesired 
effect is additional segregation. This conclusion should, however, give 
rise to doubt when one considers what we know about the laws of 
chance, and in particular the principle of entropy, which leads one 
to think that order (or what amounts to the same thing here, segre-
gation) is not spontaneously produced over and above the conscious 
efforts made to create some sort of order. Intentional actions create 
order. The problem is to know if, beyond, the unintentional conse-
quences create on the average more order than disorder. Then, there 
would actually be a kind of system effect. The most probable dynamic 
is, on the contrary, that which spontaneously produces disorder or, in 
this case, a mixture associated with a low level of segregation (which 
will be computed later in this paper). This raises a question: what is 
the generality of Schelling’s model? For we cannot simply state that 
there is a general evolutionary process which creates slightly more 
segregation than individuals desire. There must be implicit hypoth-
eses which explain this « evolution ». In other terms, the general 
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model which stipulates that the most probable undesired effect is 
disorder or mixture, prompts us to ask what these hypotheses are 
which must explain Schelling’s strange « paradox ».
To answer this question, after a description of the model and 
how it relates to the principle of entropy, the paper will examine the 
levels of spatial segregation which would result from chance alone. 
Although a benchmarking of this type has never been produced, 
it is obviously indispensable in order to ascertain that a given level 
of segregation is high or low. It will allow us to identify all devia-
tions that result from the process implemented by Schelling, thereby 
revealing the role played by the structural constraints or the set of 
hypotheses on which Schelling’s model is based and to show that 
they fully explain (in other words, construct, from start to finish) 
the levels of segregation that are achieved. Ultimately, it will be seen 
that segregation is the result of intolerance but that we cannot say 
– and this is the principal concern of this paper – that a low level of
individual intolerance leads to a high level of collective segregation. 
At last, we shall examine some of the many more recent proposals 
that have been made for extending the model, but only in order to 
discuss this relationship between low intolerance and segregation2.
1. Schelling’s model
Let us begin by restating the form the model took in Schelling’s 
most recent version which dates from 1978. Let us take a checker-
board (an 8x8 matrix) and place black and white pawns on it. We 
have here a very stylized representation of an urban area in which 
two groups live, for example Catholics and Protestants, rich and poor, 
or any other division. To begin with, the black and white pawns are 
arranged alternately in order to represent the best possible integra-
tion between the two communities.
Schelling then adds a rule for the displacement of pawns: although 
the individuals are tolerant, they will move if one third or less of their 
immediate neighbours are of like colour. Conversely, they will be 
contented and will not move if strictly more than one third of their 
immediate neighbours are of like colour. This rule of one third may 
2. It should nevertheless be noted that the point we are examining here, and
which has certainly contributed to the renown of Schelling’s thesis is not the central 
concern of many more recent studies that focus more on variants of Schelling’s model by 
considering only strong individual intolerances.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 22/03/2016 11h38. © Presses Universitaires de France 
17 septembre 2010 6:43 PM - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - Revue - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - 135 x 215 - page 448 / 512
449Low levels of ethnic intolerance
17 septembre 2010 6:43 PM - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - Revue - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - 135 x 215 - page 449 / 512
appear to be quite flexible. These individuals cannot be said to be 
seeking segregation; it is only when each individual wishes to be in 
the majority that they are really aiming for segregation. Below this 
level, some minorities may accept each other and a mixture between 
the two communities remains possible.
In the situation of an alternate starting situation (with empty 
corners), all the individuals are satisfied with their neighbours. 
Schelling then introduces a minor disturbance. He begins by remov-
ing 10 white pawns and 10 black pawns at random, then he selects 
5 white or black pawns at random and places these randomly on 
the board (after which there will be 45 pawns and 19 empty spaces). 
This disturbance is usually sufficient to create a degree of discontent 
and the pawns involved will then be moved randomly towards the 
blank spaces until a new equilibrium is reached in which every-
body is contented with regard to the rule of one third. Under these 
conditions, the result is surprising: black neighbourhoods and white 
neighbourhoods come into being without anybody really wishing 
it, at least that is what appears to happen. As we can see in Figure 1, 
there is a high degree of segregation once this process of migra-
tion has finished. However, this outcome is not a marginal result. As 
Schelling states, if one plays this game several times a similar result 
will usually be obtained. Actually, as we shall see below, if several 
thousand simulations are performed a non-negligible standard devia-
tion is observed around the mean segregation. But the mean segre-
gation closely matches the outcome described by Schelling.
What is so striking in this model is that everybody knows that 
order does not appear spontaneously. If all the white pawns are 
placed on one side of the checkerboard and all the black ones on the 
other and the board is then agitated, a miracle has taken place if they 
are not mixed up. In a system like Schelling’s one, the most likely 
situation is that of disorder or an increase in entropy, i.e. a degree 
of integration between the two communities. In fact, in probability 
theory (whether it is applied to thermodynamics as by Boltzmann 
or to communication as by Shannon), a system that is subject to 
random agitation can reach any logically conceivable macrostate, but 
some are much more probable as many more paths lead to them (i.e. 
there are many more microstates which correspond to them), and 
sometimes so many more that the other macrostates only exist as 
theoretical possibilities. It is this tendency to move towards the most 
probable situation that Schelling’s model defies, and therefore before 
we decide that a paradox is involved we must consider whether the 
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outcome is not the expression of a set of implicit hypotheses which 
give the appearance of a surprising effect to what is only a logical 
result.
Figure 1 – An example of the movement towards segregation
(Discontented individuals are highlighted in grey)
2. the statistical estimation of social segregation with 
reference to individual tolerance
To this end, the first question that has to be asked is: what is 
the probable segregation that results from a given constraint (i.e. a 
level of individual tolerance)? As tolerance lessens, there are fewer 
and fewer possible geographical arrangements, and situations with 
high segregation become more and more probable. It is therefore 
necessary to estimate the probable level of segregation which one 
can expect to avoid confusing this probability with a paradoxical 
effect. To perform an estimate of this type, it is necessary to possess 
an indicator of the degree of segregation in a given distribution. 
And, in this connection, it has now been clearly established that 
entropy, as defined by Shannon (1948) in the context of information 
theory (based of course on the definition given by Boltzmann in 
thermodynamics), measures the degree of disorder in a system in an 
accurate and reliable manner (Kapur & Kesavan, 1992). It is written 
as follows:
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Where N
tot
 is the number of pawns on the board which have 
neighbours (i.e. that are not isolated), N
ij
 is the number of pawns 
in the neighbourhood of pawn [ij] (including itself) and C
ij
 is the 
number of paws having the same colour as pawn [ij] (again includ-
ing itself). This entropy H is divided in the above formula by its 
maximum value and therefore varies between 0 (total segregation) 
and 1 (perfect mixture). An indicator of segregation (S) is obtained 
simply by subtracting H from 1:
S = 1 – H
This index of segregation S varies from 0 in the case of perfect 
mixture to 1 in the case of total segregation. For the sake of accuracy, 
another index, denoted by S’, has also been calculated, which takes 
account of the fact that in a neighbourhood which contains, for 
example, 5 individuals, it is obviously impossible to achieve the situa-
tion of perfect mixture (2.5 black pawns and 2.5 white pawns). To 
overcome this problem it is necessary to modify standardization 
depending on whether the number of individuals living in a neigh-
bourhood is even. S’ is then computed by replacing, in the formula 
which gives S, the factor ln(2) in the denominator – which corre-
sponds in fact to an ln(1/2) and standardizes entropy to a value of 
1 when the mixture is exactly 50% – 50% – by a variable factor which 
depends on the number of residents in the neighbourhood, but stand-
ardizes to a value of 1 in the situation which is as near as possible 
to the perfect mixture (for example the situation where there are 
2 white pawns and 3 black pawns or the opposite, in neighbourhoods 
with 5 residents). However, later in this paper it will be shown that this 
difference has a negligible influence, but this needs to be verified.
For the sake of clarity, we will not make a detailed comparison 
with other possible indices of segregation. They do not possess the 
fifteen desirable properties of the Shannon index (S) for accurately 
measuring a system’s level of disorder (Kapur & Kesavan, 1992: 
27-35). They are nevertheless correlated with S. For example the 
index of dissimilarity D, which is frequently used in studies of 
urban segregation (Fossett, 2006: 202), overestimates segregation 
when individual intolerance is low, but this overestimation becomes 
less marked as intolerance increases and almost disappears when it 
becomes very high. In fact, the relation between S and D is approxi-
mately D = 0.8S + 0.2 and, ultimately, the coefficient of correlation 
between the two is equal to 99.6% for all the values of segregation 
that can be calculated for all the possible intolerance levels.
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The problem now is how to estimate the statistically likely level 
of segregation that will result from a given constraint. It is difficult 
to obtain here an analytical solution, as it has been shown in physics 
and mathematics. In physics, models known as Ising Spin Models 
are used to investigate phase changes in a magnetic system where 
there are local interactions between spins, which makes such models 
partially similar to Schelling’s3 one. However, at present, there is no 
analytical solution to these models, even in relatively simple cases. In 
Mathematics, random Markov Field models, which are also similar 
to Schelling’s model, do not afford analytical solutions either. One of 
the most fruitful approaches uses the Monte Carlo method, which is 
based on repeated computer simulations.
This method involves performing millions of simulations on 
Schelling’s checkerboard in order to derive a statistic and then 
examining the characteristics of this statistic. The objective is to 
produce the segregation statistic S or S’ as a function of the individ-
ual tolerance threshold. This would express the chances of obtain-
ing randomly a checkerboard in which all individuals are satisfied 
with their neighbours with a observed threshold. Table 1 gives the 
result for 100 million randomly selected checkerboards for which 
Schelling’s conditions apply (20 black pawns, 20 white pawns, and 
5 pawns randomly distributed between the two colours; the four 
corners are not necessarily empty).
Table 1 – The statistic for 100 million randomly selected checkerboards
Observed 
threshold
Occu- 
rrences
Segre-
gation S
Segre-
gation S’
Standard 
Deviation
1st 
decile
1st 
Quartile
Median 3rd
Quartile
9th 
decile
0 97,005,480 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.23
1/8 90,754 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.25
1/7 663,633 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.25
1/6 1,285,699 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.24
1/5 815,249 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.24
1/4 134,583 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.26
2/7 3,407 0.21 0.20 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.26 0.31
1/3 1,195 0.25 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.31 0.37
nb: Standard deviation, deciles, median and quartiles have been computed for the 
segregation S.
Interpretation: Out of the 100 million samples, 1,195 checkerboards consist of indi-
viduals at least 1/3 of whose neighbours are identical to them and, furthermore, at least 
one of these individuals has exactly 1/3 identical neighbours. The average segregation S 
for these checkerboards is 0.25.
3. Only partially, because the value of the spin can flip, while pawns cannot
change their colour.
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The first thing to emerge from these simulations is that it is 
almost impossible to obtain randomly a checkerboard in which a 
level of satisfaction is strictly greater than one third (i.e. the thresh-
old selected by Schelling). Out of the 100 million checkerboards 
that were generated, none were obtained. Even after generating 
200 million checkerboards, still none were obtained. Unsurprisingly, 
the second law of thermodynamics has been confirmed! The most 
probable situations correspond to high entropies, that is to say check-
erboards where segregation is the lowest. In 97% of the checker-
boards, at least one individual has no like neighbour and the average 
value of segregation S is 0.15. The next most likely case is that where 
the least satisfied individual has only one like individual out of six 
neighbours. In this case, segregation rises to 0.16. And so on and 
so forth.
If now we imagine a Schelling checkerboard in which the pawns 
move in a random manner, whether they are satisfied or not, with 
no premature cessation of the process, we can deduce the average 
temporal segregation (which is also the average value of the previous 
statistic – the phase space statistic – as a consequence of the ergodic 
principle). In the same way it is possible to find out the scale of 
the variations. The continual mixing will in all probability maintain 
the minimum demand level which is observed within the check-
erboard at zero, but occasionally some variations will occur. With 
one different checkerboard generated every second, the observed 
minimum demand will increase to 1/3 approximately once every 
83,752 seconds, that is to say about once a day. However, there is little 
chance that even after 3 years, a checkerboard where a minimum 
demand strictly greater than 1/3 is met will appear.
The Monte Carlo method does not therefore inform about 
segregation for levels which are strictly higher than one third. 
However, it is straightforward to compute the average segregation 
of the checkerboards where an observed minimum is satisfied. This 
is done by computing an average which is weighted by the number 
of occurrences of the segregations corresponding to the checker-
boards with minimum demands that are equal to or higher than the 
fixed level.
Table 2 – Average segregation S as a function of the minimum tolerated level
Minimum 
threshold
0 1/8 1/7 1/6 1/5 1/4 2/7 1/3
Segregation 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris -   - 193.54.67.94 - 22/03/2016 11h38. © Presses Universitaires de France 
Michel Forsé, Maxime Parodi454
17 septembre 2010 6:43 PM - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - Revue - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - 135 x 215 - page 454 / 512 17 septembre 2010 6:43 PM - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - Revue - L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE - 135 x 215 - page 455 / 512
These values are given in Table 2. They give the reference levels of 
segregation, that is to say a value against which we can position a given 
level of segregation attained by Schelling’s model. Let us consider the 
situation where the minimum requirement of every individual is to 
have 1/3 similar neighbours. If we choose at random one checker-
board among all those that meet this criterion, on average we should 
expect it to have a level of segregation of 0.25. The crucial question is 
now to decide if there is a paradoxical effect when we play Schelling’s 
game, that is to say which is neutral from a random standpoint but 
which tends to increase this segregation even further.
3. Simulations of Schelling’s game
To answer this question, we need to perform the simulations 
for this game. This should make it possible to measure two things: 
the final segregation S, but also the real tolerance of the individu-
als in this model. The first thing to note is that Schelling presents 
his model in a deceptive way. He presents the individual tolerance 
threshold as a continuous variable where in fact it is a discreet varia-
ble, which completely modifies the interpretation of the results. Let 
us consider the case where an individual has three neighbours. What 
concrete form does an individual’s demand for more than a third 
of like neighbours take? By rejecting situations with no or one like 
neighbours. The individual accepts only the situations where 2 or 
more of his neighbours are of like colour. In other words, he wants 
to belong to the majority. He rejects 0/3, 1/3 and accepts only 2/3 
and 3/3. Although it might be stated that the individual is ready to 
accept 34%, in discreet concrete applications, as an individual can 
obviously not have for example 1.6 neighbours, this means that in 
reality his minimum intolerance level is 2/3. This calculation can 
of course be carried out for each possible number of neighbours 
from 1 to 8. For example, in Schelling’s case where the threshold is 
more than 1/3, the real minimum intolerance corresponds to: 1 like 
neighbour out of 1 neighbour in all, 1 like neighbour at least out of 2, 
2 like neighbours at least out of 3, 2 like neighbours at least out of 4, 
2 like neighbours out of 5, 3 out of 6, 3 out of 7 and at last, 3 out 
of 8. The minimum accepted proportions are therefore as follows: 
1/1, 1/2, 2/3, 2/4, 2/5, 3/6, 3/7 and 3/8 (the numerator being the 
minimum number of like neighbours and the denominator the total 
number of neighbours). As we can see in this series, the 34% level 
chosen by Schelling does not appear in any of the cases of numbers 
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of neighbours that can occur during a simulation. Next, it is straight-
forward to establish this series of minimum proportions which are 
really accepted for any continuous level of intolerance (between 0 
and 1). Consequently, for a given threshold, it is possible to calcu-
late the average minimum intolerance which is effectively present in 
the model by weighting each of these proportions by the number 
of times it has been encountered during a simulation, i.e. by taking 
account of all the stages that lead to a final state of equilibrium (at 
which time there are no dissatisfied pawns). In the rest of this paper, 
the term effective intolerance will be used to describe the result of this 
calculation as it is this intolerance that corresponds to situations that 
may effectively be encountered and that we will simply weight by 
the number of times they occurred during a simulation that ended 
with equilibrium.
But before performing this calculation, it should also be noted 
that the initial conditions of Schelling’s model constitute another 
important factor. These conditions are quite exceptional: they are 
always very close to perfect alternation which greatly diminishes the 
generality of the model. Here as elsewhere it is difficult to draw 
general conclusions from a model whose initial conditions are 
extremely unusual. Of course, as we are discussing Schelling’s model, 
we have performed simulations starting from the same initial condi-
tions. Strictly speaking, once pawns have been randomly removed, 
the starting point is an almost alternate one (with empty corners). 
But we have also performed simulations starting from completely 
random situations (as was done to obtain the results given in Table 
1, where in each simulation there were 20 black pawns, 20 white 
pawns, and 5 pawns that were randomly distributed between the two 
colours). As will be seen below, the comparison between the 
two starting points is highly instructive. By starting from a random 
situation we would nevertheless be better able to compare the results 
obtained with the random reference previously established.
In principal, other features of Schelling’s game could affect the 
final segregation, but as their effect is very much more marginal 
they can easily be ignored. To begin with, Schelling leaves the four 
corners of the board empty. This is to counteract to some extent the 
edge effects, which are real. In fact, simulations performed with or 
without this constraint produce very similar results. Likewise, increas-
ing the size of the checkerboard (which diminishes the impact of 
edge effects) or considering a toric surface does not give a funda-
mentally different result from that observed by Schelling. Secondly, 
the numbers of black and white pawns are not the same. But here 
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too, if we impose a condition of equality we obtain practically 
the same result as Schelling. Lastly, the dissatisfied pawns move to the 
nearest satisfactory position. The effect here is to speed up conver-
gence to equilibrium, which is understandable if, like Schelling, one 
performs the operations manually. But it is obviously not necessary if 
one can use a computer. If the pawns are moved randomly, conver-
gence to equilibrium takes longer time, but the end result is very 
similar to that obtained with Schelling’s procedure. So, simulations 
can be performed on checkerboards of various sizes, with random 
moves, with or without empty corners, with or without a condi-
tion of equality as regards the numbers of pawns of the two colours, 
without changing the order of magnitude of the results obtained by 
following exactly the conditions specified by Schelling in 1978. In 
what follows we will retain the same size of checkerboard but relax 
these unnecessary constraints which make the situation less random 
in order to draw as close as possible to a random situation as this 
is the reference with which we wish to compare the results. The 
fact that we can do this without significantly changing the levels 
of segregation that are obtained when Schelling’s instructions are 
followed to the letter is to Schelling’s credit as it shows that his model 
is robust with respect to these constraints.
In addition, we shall only consider balanced results, by which 
we mean those that satisfy the condition for stopping moves that 
stipulates that ultimately all the pawns must be contented with their 
environment. Under some conditions, for example when there is 
not enough empty room, this equilibrium may be unattainable. In 
this case, we may be faced with a state that is fairly stable (as regards 
the level of segregation) but not stationary. We shall not discuss these 
states here as they occurred very rarely in our simulations. Anyway, 
they were not considered by Schelling himself although they have 
been dealt with in some recent studies. We shall nevertheless return 
to this topic when discussing the studies in question.
4. Explanation of the results
4.1. Real individual intolerance is considerably underestimated
Table 3 shows the results for the simulations conducted for 
different levels of individual demand, under the conditions we have 
fixed above. We are now in a position to make three observations 
about them.
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1) Real (« discreet ») intolerance is always considerably greater
than is suggested by the corresponding continuous level as used by 
Schelling, that is to say chosen in the continuous domain4.
Table 3 – Results of simulations of Schelling’s game with almost alternate 
starting situations and random starting situations 
Starting 
situation Random Almost alternate
Minimum 
level
real 
intolerance segregation
real 
intolerance segregation
  0[ (0.01]) 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.10
1/8[ (0.13]) 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.09
1/7[ (0.15]) 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.09
1/6[ (0.17]) 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.10
1/5[ (0.21]) 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.13
1/4[ (0.26]) 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.23
2/7[ (0.29]) 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.32
1/3[ (0.34]) 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57
3/8[ (0.38]) 0.51 0.59 0.50 0.60
2/5[ (0.41]) 0.55 0.66 0.54 0.67
3/7[ (0.43]) 0.57 0.70 0.56 0.71
1/2[ (0.51]) 0.69 0.84 0.69 0.85
4/7[ (0.58]) 0.70 0.88 0.70 0.88
nb: The calculations were performed for each threshold after 1000 simulations in the 
case of the almost alternate starting situation (with empty corners) in order to reproduce 
Schelling’s initial conditions and also after 1000 simulations for the random starting situ-
ation. There were 45 pawns on each checkerboard (20 black, 20 white and 5 randomly 
distributed between the two in each starting situation). In this case the minimum level, in 
the sense the term is used by Schelling, is the threshold individuals wish to exceed strictly. 
The possible minimum thresholds are listed in the first column of this table in ascending 
order from 0 to 4/7 (exclusive). The inclusive minimum tolerance thresholds are shown 
on the right, rounded to two decimal places.
2) For the threshold of more than one third applied by Schelling, 
this intolerance is in reality of the order of 50%. With a so high 
level, the observed segregation is the logical outcome and there is no 
4. In the following, we shall summarize this choice by the expression « conti-
nuous threshold ».
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reason for perceiving a paradox in this case. With such a high level 
of individual demand, which does not arise by chance alone (see 
Table 1 or 2) and which expresses a preference or a near preference 
on the part of every individual to live in an environment where he/
she is in the majority, it is not surprising that the environment attains 
a high degree of segregation, which is abnormal compared with the 
random result presented in Table 1. When one applies a highly segre-
gationist rule that everyone must obey one finds this high segrega-
tion in the result.
3) On the other hand, when the effective intolerance is approxi-
mately 1/3, the segregation is approximately 0.25 for random 
starting situations (it even falls to 0.13 for quasi-alternate start-
ing situations). However, this figure corresponds to what one can 
anticipate from the effect of chance on its own (see Tables 1 or 2), as 
it is the same order of magnitude as the segregation that is obtained 
when one simply places the same number of pawns at random on a 
checkerboard and notes that the distribution satisfies the individual 
tolerance level of an inclusive third of the pawns (after repeating 
the operation millions of times). In addition, in this case a third 
of the checkerboards exceed the value of 0.28, a quarter exceed a 
segregation level 0.31 and there is a 10% chance of overall segrega-
tion exceeding 0.37 (see Table 1).
The conclusion is therefore clear: presenting the rule of one 
third as a continuous variable conceals an individual intolerance 
which is actually much higher (approximately one half). The 
level of segregation obtained is not at all surprising in view of the 
real sorting rule (which is abnormal compared with the random 
situation) that has been adopted. On the contrary, when this 
real rule is effectively set at around one third, sorting logically 
appears to be quite incapable of producing more segregation 
than is produced randomly. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is 
no Schelling effect over and above the segregation that is gener-
ated by chance.
4.2 A linear link between intolerance and segregation
The fact that the effects of a certain level of intolerance are 
not disproportionate to the observed segregation is also apparent 
if we examine the relationship between the different levels of 
effective intolerance and the resulting segregation. Figure 2 shows 
the results from all the simulations for the random starting points 
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(1,000 for each level) that are presented in Table 3. In these results, 
we can observe no break or tipping in the segregation level above 
a given level of intolerance. Quite good fit is obtained for these 
data with a linear function (R2 = 0.85), in any case better than 
that obtained with the other possible functions such as a logisti-
cal function (R2 = 0.83), whose « S » shape is so flattened that 
it is quite difficult to distinguish it from a straight line (and yet it 
is this type of function which is commonly used to model diffu-
sion processes and, in the present case, « contagion » phenom-
ena associated with moderately intolerant dissatisfaction). The 
best model, and the best explanation, therefore always consists 
of stating that the resulting segregation is simply proportional to 
individual intolerance.
It should be noted that the dispersion of the segregation (i.e. the 
vertical dimension of each of the « ellipses » in Figure 2) is approx-
imately normally distributed around its mean, which incidentally 
agrees well with Schelling’s result. As it has been observed by Zhang 
(2004a) and Young (1998), we can speak of « stochastically stable » 
simulations, but in the case of a given simulation we can nevertheless 
move away from this mean (given in Table 3) and achieve a consider-
ably higher or lower degree of segregation. The dispersion of segre-
gation nevertheless tends to be considerably lower when intolerance 
is high.
In the case of quasi-alternate starting situations (see Figure 3), 
what is above all apparent is a marked reduction in dispersion in 
the case of low individual demands (we shall return to the explana-
tion of this very striking difference with random starting situations 
later). In spite of this, the fit that is achieved by a straight line is 
once more the best it is possible to find. The R2 value in this case 
is 0.89, which is once again slightly better than that obtained with 
a logistical function (R2 = 0.87), which in this case too resem-
bles a straight line. Even here, segregation remains proportional to 
individual intolerance.
Obviously, our aim is not to fit a straight line at any price. To 
understand the relationship between intolerance and segregation, 
all that is necessary is to examine the shape of the scatterplot. 
Nevertheless, if one considers that a nonlinear fit is satisfactory 
and that this provides some support for the idea that there is a 
paradoxical effect in Schelling’s model, we must highlight that 
a linear fit is always on the average better, whatever the starting 
situation.
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Figure 2 – Scatterplot of social segregation and individual intolerance 
for random starting situations
Figure 3 – Scatterplot of social segregation and individual intolerance for 
almost alternate starting situations
Interpretation: In the case of both random and almost alternate starting situa-
tions, 1,000 simulations were carried out for each of the levels listed in Table 3. 
Each point is the result of a simulation involving the effective individual intoler-
ance and the final segregation (S) on the checkerboard.
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4.3 The results vary according to the population density
At a given threshold, it is nevertheless important to realize that 
it is possible to vary the real tolerance and therefore the segrega-
tion by modifying the density of the pawns on the checkerboard. 
To give an example, let us retain the threshold of one third (exclu-
sive) and compare the results we have just obtained for a density of 
approximately 70% (= 45/64) with those for a lower density of 60% 
(with 38 pawns) and a higher density of approximately 80% (with 
52 pawns). In Schelling’s situation, a pawn has, on average, 4.7 neigh-
bours which most frequently number 3, 4, 5 or 6 and which corre-
sponds to minimum requirement thresholds of 2/3, 2/4, 2/5 and 3/6 
leading, as we have seen, to a mean effective intolerance of 0.50. 
Lower density means that there is more room for districts with a 
small number of neighbours. The most frequent situations involve 1, 
2, 3 or 4 neighbours (on average 3.9), i.e. high minimum intolerances 
of 1/1, 1/2, 2/3 and 2/4. In this case, the mean effective intolerance 
for all the simulations is equal to 0.54. With a higher density, there 
are necessarily fewer such districts (one pawn has 5.4 neighbours on 
average). The most frequent situations involve 5, 6, 7, or 8 neigh-
bours with what are in this case lower minimum demands: 2/5, 3/6, 
3/7 and 3/8. There is therefore a reduction in the mean effective 
intolerance which is now only 0.47. The overall segregation levels (at 
equilibrium) obviously therefore follow the different levels of effec-
tive intolerance that correspond to the different densities. Thus with 
a density of 60%, the effective mean intolerance of 0.54 leads to a 
mean segregation of 0.63. With a density of 70%, the intolerance of 
0.50 leads to a segregation of 0.57, and with a density of 80% intoler-
ance falls to 0.47 and leads to a segregation of 0.51. Ultimately, when 
the satisfaction threshold in the continuous domain is fixed, in this 
example as in the case of Schelling’s model at one third, the higher 
the density the lower the effective intolerance and, consequently, the 
segregation. If we follow Schelling’s model, we would therefore need 
to believe that for a given level of individual preference, there would 
be more segregation in a small town than in a large one. This is a 
prediction which may be contradicted empirically. In any case, it is 
possible to modify the levels of segregation that are attained, all other 
things being equal, in Schelling’s model by modifying the overall 
population density.
In this connection, it is important to note that while the density 
leads to a marked change in the interpretation of the threshold fixed 
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in the continuous domain and therefore, of final segregation, the 
effective intolerance appears to be a good predictor of segregation 
independently of density. In other words, as a first approximation, 
it is quite possible to construct a table of correspondence between 
effective intolerance and final segregation which takes account of the 
results of simulations with any level of density. Density only provides 
a second-order correction. The correspondence table between the 
continuous threshold and the final segregation is much less reliable. 
This provides further confirmation that the effective intolerance is 
the most relevant information in the present case, not the threshold.
4.4 Dependency on initial conditions
In view of this, let us return to Figures 2 and 3 and see how it 
is possible to explain the differences in the shape of the scatterplot 
between the quasi-alternate starting situations and the random start-
ing situations with moderate levels of intolerance. This difference 
is also observed in the case of the mean values set out in Table 3. 
In particular, this table and these figures show that this applies only 
for low levels of intolerance and that it breaks down as intolerance 
increases. The two series converge almost perfectly, particularly above 
the level of one third. This highlights the fact that the so-called 
Schelling « effect » is not due to a special phenomenon – such as, 
for example, a catastrophic bifurcation – that occurs with a moderate 
intolerance threshold. The impression of an effect is simply gener-
ated by the selection of starting checkerboards where the alternation 
is almost too perfect to be realistic. It is therefore not due to excessive 
segregation above a certain level, but, on the contrary, to excessively 
low segregation below this level.
To clarify this point, it is first of all necessary to re-examine the 
hypotheses which underlie the ergodic principle. The result obtained 
with the Monte Carlo method is the average segregation for all the 
possible states of the checkerboard (with a constraint in the form 
of a minimum level). If it is assumed that the pawns on the check-
erboard move randomly in very large numbers while complying 
with the constraints in place, the ergodic principle can be applied. 
This consists of saying that the temporal average of the segregation 
observed on the checkerboard tends towards the calculated average 
for all the possible states. The equalization of the averages is based on 
the idea that this random movement of the pawns will, after a certain 
period of time, cover all the possible situations without favouring any 
of them as a result of the random nature of the movements.
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However, following the rules of Schelling’s game, the ergodic 
principle is not verified. The game can stop rapidly, meaning that the 
final segregation does not have enough time to converge towards its 
target (the segregation calculated by the Monte Carlo method). The 
ergodic principle comes down to ignoring the initial conditions on 
the grounds that random movements will eventually remove any 
features that depend on the starting point: under these conditions, 
the only factor that counts is chance. In Schelling’s game, on the 
contrary, path dependency exists as the final checkerboard is still very 
similar to the initial checkerboard. This is obviously what happens 
in the case of simulations with checkerboards with an almost alter-
nate starting point. With low demand levels, only a few moves are 
required for everybody to be contented and final segregation remains 
particularly low and near to the initial segregation. This explains why 
the results for the alternate starting situation are also close to the first 
decile of the Monte Carlo distribution.
With such a starting point, the rules of Schelling’s game are not 
necessary to increase segregation. Even pure random movements 
would lead to an increase. Choosing this exceptional starting point, 
as for the integration of both communities, a dynamic is attributed to 
a « Schelling effect » while random movements can easily produce it. 
Next, obviously, the higher the level of intolerance, the less apparent 
this dependency on the initial conditions becomes. The results are no 
longer affected by the starting situation. Beyond the threshold of one 
third, which in fact expresses the intention of each individual to live 
in an environment where he/she is almost in the majority, there is 
no longer a difference between the random and the quasi-alternate 
starting situations. But the difference between the segregation that is 
obtained for this threshold and the starting point is obviously much 
more striking if this starting point is one of alternation rather than a 
random situation.
4.5. A selective migration process which generates nucleation
Another constraint that results from the rules of the game is added 
to those we have just described above in order to produce the result 
observed by Schelling. On the one hand, it is assumed that there is 
random movement within each of the checkerboards which complies 
with a given threshold constraint and from which a target distribu-
tion for segregation is deduced. On the other hand, there is a selective 
movement from checkerboards that fail to satisfy this level, and this 
movement is continued until a satisfactory position for each pawn 
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is obtained. There would be convergence between the final segre-
gations if, once a satisfactory checkerboard was obtained using 
Schelling’s method pawns continued to move randomly with the 
only constraint of producing no dissatisfied pawn. However this is not 
the form Schelling’s model takes. One of its implicit hypotheses is, 
on the contrary, that satisfied pawns never move. This means that the 
migratory process is not simply a minimal selective movement, which 
would only require pawns to move from an unsatisfactory position 
to a satisfactory position by any path; at the same time it is a selective 
process which imposes potentially different mobilities on the pawns. 
There is no potential for the inhabitants of a completely homogene-
ous neighbourhood to move. Physicists talk of nucleation phenomena 
in this connection. Homogeneous cores will form in a mixture if the 
bonding energy between like pawns (the energy required to create a 
homogeneous neighbourhood) is lower than the pressure exerted by 
the pawns of the opposite colour. In this case, the homogeneous cores 
will grow until they encounter excessive pressure. In the Schelling 
model, the cost of forming a homogeneous neighbourhood is nil so 
any homogeneous neighbourhood can only increase and not decrease 
in size. It should be noted that nucleation phenomena are kinetic in 
nature and explain divergences from the thermodynamic equilibrium. 
They are transitory states or metastable equilibrium states (that is to say 
in a precarious equilibrium where a small change can bring the system 
back to stable equilibrium). Schelling’s model thus produces a metast-
able equilibrium by means of a rule whose significance is not directly 
stated, namely the rule of never making satisfied pawns move. If we 
can draw a parallel, this rule is like telling a cook to make pancake 
mixture without breaking up the lumps and then finding it surprising 
that the lumps have not disappeared but have even grown!
This rule explains why the final segregation of the checker-
boards obtained with Schelling’s method for a random starting point 
is slightly higher than the equilibrium segregation (from the Monte 
Carlo method). However, as it has been said above, for effective intol-
erances below 50%, the results differ very little from those obtained 
with the Monte Carlo method.
5. Beyond Schelling’s model
If we put all the above elements together, it is clearly apparent 
that there is no paradox in the results given by Schelling’s model. It 
is not possible to maintain that in general a low level of individual 
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intolerance leads to high collective segregation. Nevertheless, this 
model has been very widely applied in different fields such as 
economics, game theory and urban sociology. Many variants have 
been put forward in which the role played by one parameter or 
another is modified. It is obviously impossible to deal here with all 
the conceivable variants. With regard to the point we are making, 
we must however examine those which might put our explanation 
of Schelling’s « paradox » to the test. In this connection, there are 
essentially two issues which must draw our attention. First, we have 
shown that the small number of neighbours is completely responsi-
ble for creating the illusion of low theoretical tolerance when effec-
tive intolerance is high. It is therefore important to increase the size 
of the neighbourhood in order to see what happens. Next, we have 
highlighted the role played by the hypothesis that satisfied indivi-
duals never move, but its impact can be evaluated with even more 
precision.
Let us begin with the issue of the neighbourhood size. A 
maximum of eight neighbours is too little to distinguish on a finely 
graduated scale between low intolerance and high intolerance, 
and we have seen the outcome. There are however many ways of 
overcoming this problem, for example by changing the form of the 
checkerboard or the size of the neighbourhood, or by permitting 
the stacking of pawns. What happens when these parameters are 
modified? In particular, what happens when the size of the neigh-
bourhood is increased beyond the first ring? This extension reduces 
the size of the discreet jumps, making the structure of the game less 
coarse. This allows us to examine models in which the (continuous) 
theoretical level is less misleading with regard to the (discreet) effec-
tive intolerance. What, a priori, should we expect under these condi-
tions? Let us consider the case where there are as many white pawns 
as black pawns and begin with considering the extreme case where 
the neighbourhood is so large that it takes in the entire checkerboard. 
It is quite clear that everybody will be satisfied up to the precise 
threshold of 50% and dissatisfied above. In the first case, nothing 
happens. In the second, everybody is and will remain dissatisfied, 
however the pawns are arranged. Let us now consider an intermedi-
ate situation where the neighbourhood is large without covering the 
entire checkerboard. In this case, each pawn has a large number of 
neighbours and the structure of the game enables each individual to 
be above the 33% threshold without automatically wishing to belong 
to the majority. Mixture, which was almost impossible in Schelling’s 
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structure above 33% threshold becomes the most likely situation and 
constitutes a stable state for intolerance thresholds below 50%. As 
soon as one draws close to or exceeds the decisive threshold of 50% 
however, the extension of the neighbourhood will lead to moving 
on a very large scale. The reason for this is that increasing the size of 
the neighbourhood also increases the « community of destinies » and 
if, for example, a white pawn is dissatisfied in a large district, all the 
white pawns in this district are dissatisfied at the same time and they 
will all move until there are none of them left there. This process 
cannot be described as paradoxical: it is the logical and perfectly 
foreseeable outcome of a collective moving rule. It does not illustrate 
a « domino » effect. What is occurring is simply the rapid homoge-
nisation of mixed districts by simultaneous moves of those who are 
dissatisfied and that are identified as such from the starting situation.
This hypothesis has been clearly confirmed by a research 
conducted by Laurie and Jaggi (2003). This involved « Schelling-
like » simulations with different sizes of neighbourhood. They 
considered that the distance between two pawns was equal to the 
number of rows and columns between them. In other words, they 
counted the number of spaces that separate two pawns by moving 
along the rows or columns of the checkerboard but not along the 
diagonals (the distance between two pawns is: |x
2
 – x
1
| + |y
2
 – y
1
|). 
Then, they defined the neighbourhood with a radius R as being that 
set of pawns that was located at a distance of less than R. They then 
showed that almost nothing happened with a 30% threshold when 
the neighbourhood consisted of all the pawns which were less than 
3 spaces away from the central pawn (R=3); in addition, there were 
even fewer moves for R=5. However, with a 50% threshold, which 
would logically force segregation, these scholars observed that the 
larger the neighbourhoods, the larger the homogeneous zones. Thus, 
for R=1 or R=3, segregation was already high and the zones were 
already homogeneous, but there were still many regions of contact 
between opposite colours. For R=5, there were fewer of these; the 
boundaries became straight, because no pawns could cross the bound-
ary between two regions. In the case of low levels stability therefore 
increased, and in the case of high levels massive movement occurred 
within larger and larger « communities of destiny ». Once one has 
understood the role of each parameter, all the cases in their study 
are readily explained (even if some criticisms have been made of the 
model in particular by Fossett and Waren, 2005). Lastly, it should be 
noted that Laurie and Jaggi failed to realize that if the neighbourhood 
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radius is reduced to 1 – a situation in which the central pawn has at 
most 4 neighbours – the discreet jumps have the maximum effect 
and it is simply absurd to speak of a threshold of 33% when the 
effective intolerance is necessarily greater than 50%.
When all is said and done, extending the neighbourhood is a 
useful strategy for reducing the role of the discrete intolerance in 
Schelling’s model. Nevertheless, this extension has impacts. Schelling’s 
idea is that, little by little, very local differences cause general effects. 
But extending the neighbourhood amounts to transforming local 
differences into large « communities of destiny ». The problem of the 
discreet jump is therefore solved, but by moving to another model 
which is not really appropriate for the phenomenon that Schelling 
was attempting to examine.
There are however other ways of reducing the problem of the 
difference between the continuous threshold and effective (discrete) 
intolerance. The most widely used consists in replacing the level 
of intolerance by a continuous utility function. This strategy was, 
in particular, pursued by Junfu Zhang (2004b), Roman Pancs and 
Nicolaas vriend (2007) or Elizabeth Bruch and Robert Mare (2006). 
From the outset, we must nevertheless note that this constitutes a 
substantial modification of Schelling’s « paradox », as we no longer 
know beyond what quantum of utility we should be surprised to 
obtain a segregated checkerboard. To decide on this point, we need 
to be able to compare the result to a reference (in the same way as 
we did above), but it is precisely this comparison which is absent 
from the research in question. Moreover, if the utility function is 
an increasing function which is therefore favourable to creating the 
most homogeneous neighbourhood possible, the Pareto optimum 
can be easily characterized without even performing a computation: 
the optimum is achieved when on the checkerboard the black pawns 
are separated as well as possible from the white pawns. The utility of 
each pawn is at this point maximum.
However, these studies have the value of allowing us to test our 
second explanation which is based on the role played by the fact that 
satisfied individuals do not move. To understand what is involved 
here it is no doubt useful to examine the analogy put forward by 
Dejan vinkovic and Alan Kirman (2006) between Schelling’s model 
and the physics of a fluid which cools while nucleations take place 
within it. For this phenomenon to be observed, two conditions must 
be met. First, the fluid in question must have a kinetic that favours 
the formation of pure clusters in that these must form more rapidly 
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(at least up to a certain size) than they are broken up. Second, this 
fluid must be cooled in order to « freeze » the pure clusters perma-
nently, or they would merely be transient. In statistical physics, the 
temperature is the indicator of thermal agitation and may be consid-
ered as being analogous to the rate of moving (the « agitation » of the 
individuals) in society. This analogy shows that Schelling’s conclusion 
is also based on these two conditions which must now be reformu-
lated in social terms. The favourable kinetic corresponds to the central 
hypothesis that only individuals who are dissatisfied with the colour 
of their neighbours move. The second condition assumes, among 
other things, that one is within a society which is « cooling down », 
i.e. within a society where nobody would move for other reasons 
than their racial preferences until such a time as everyone is satisfied 
from this viewpoint. It is therefore essential to check the « tempera-
ture », i.e. the moving behaviour of individuals as soon as one wishes 
to identify a Schelling effect within a real society. It is not sufficient 
to observe that individuals have requirements that are only slightly 
segregationist, we need to observe in addition that these demands 
are the only factors which determine their decision to move. This is 
a major hypothesis because we all know – and Schelling as well as 
anybody – that individuals also move for reasons that have nothing 
to do with the colour of their neighbours.
As soon as these other reasons for moving are considered, the 
society becomes the location of movements which are independent 
from racial or ethnic issues and which are capable of dismantling 
ghettoes or stopping them from forming. Apart from a kinetic which 
is favourable to the formation of ghettoes, we need in reality to take 
account of a competing kinetic which is indifferent to ethnic prefer-
ences and, as a simple consequence of this, favourable to mixture. It is 
important to stress this point. The unintentional consequence of a 
blind social dynamic is very likely to be disorder, noise or pollution. 
The entropy principle explains this very well. There is no need to 
target mixture to achieve it. On the contrary, it is when segregation is 
obtained that we need to ask questions about the mechanisms which 
have caused it. Schelling’s mechanism only produces segregation in 
proportion to what the individuals desire and, as we have shown, 
there are no grounds for stating that they obtain more segregation 
than what can be inferred from their preferences. Put simply, disor-
der is the most likely situation within a closed system, that is to say 
a system that changes without any external influence. In order to 
obtain order, we need to consider an open system similar to Kirman 
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and vinkovic’s cooling fluid which looses energy when solidifying. 
But even in this case, it is imperative to show clearly the role played 
by the environment by controlling for its influence. In this connec-
tion, there are countless possibilities. It is well known, for example, 
that different rates of cooling of a liquid alloy can lead to different 
structures (slow cooling as opposed to quenching). The question is 
which of the two kinetics – that which forms homogeneous clusters 
or that which favours mixtures – dominates the other within a given 
experimental system, knowing that on the way stable equilibria, 
metastable equilibria or situations with no equilibrium may occur. In 
the case of Schelling’s model, it therefore seems difficult to conclude 
that a ghetto effect exists without investigating the general level of 
moves, whether these are motivated by issues of racial tolerance or 
not. To sum up, either we consider that Schelling’s model does not 
apply to present-day societies which are manifestly « hot » socie-
ties, or we test the model again by maintaining individuals’ levels of 
moving for all sorts of reasons, at a high level, but at the same time 
this alters the stopping condition of the game.
In this connection, the modelling performed by Elizabeth Bruch 
and Robert Mare (2006) allows us to observe what happens when the 
« temperature » is maintained almost steady within the society. Instead 
of making only dissatisfied people move, these scholars have modified 
the moving decision function by adding chance. What they devel-
oped was therefore a probabilistic choice model (known as a random 
utility model), in which the decision to move is no longer entirely 
determined by an individual’s neighbours but is simply made more 
probable. There is therefore continual mobility in addition to that of 
the dissatisfied pawns. This is not the only difference with Schelling’s 
model. In particular, Bruch and Mare had to abandon the stopping 
condition of Schelling’s game: the game no longer stops when every-
body is satisfied5. The degree of segregation is now measured during 
the game. It nevertheless appears that this provides a good test of the 
Schelling effect, when the movements of individuals on other than 
racial grounds are controlled for. However, like many other schol-
ars who have proposed simulations that follow on from Schelling, 
the tolerance threshold adopted for the discreet case is no longer 
5. This abandonment is completely compatible with the idea that underlies this new
model as it attempts to incorporate random agitation that corresponds to a form of tem-
perature fluctuation. Maintaining the previous stopping condition would mean that the 
game would only stop if, by chance, the temperature fell to absolute zero. As the chances of 
this occurring are very small, the game would only end in fairly exceptional circumstances 
which could not really be used to learn general lessons about segregation.
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34% but 50%. So basically what the model does is to observe that if 
everybody wants to belong to the majority the result is high segrega-
tion. The paradox which made Schelling’s model so famous has been 
lost, but it is nevertheless possible to learn useful lessons from their 
simulations. Thus, they state there is no longer a Schelling effect when 
the probability of moving increases continuously with the propor-
tion of neighbours of different colours increases. Allowing satisfied 
individuals to move therefore prevents the formation of ghettoes. 
The study by Arnout van de Rijt, David Siegel and Michael Macy 
(2009) disputes Bruch and Mare’s findings. Nevertheless, the two 
studies are very similar and their findings are perfectly consistent. The 
disagreement relates to the difference between the situation where 
the probability of moving increases continuously with the propor-
tion of neighbours of different colour (« continuous preferences ») 
and the case where the same probability increases suddenly beyond 
the 50% threshold (« threshold preferences »). However, it is quite 
obvious that this difference depends on the movements of satisfied 
individuals. The greater the number of moves, the more the conclu-
sions favour Bruch and Mare. And conversely, Rijt, Siegel and Macy 
confirm that there is a difference between the continuous and the 
threshold preferences and conclude that the scale of random moves 
among satisfied individuals is unfavourable to segregation: « we find 
that random behavior eventually precludes segregation with both 
functional forms, but more randomness is required if preferences are 
threshold » (2009: 1172). In fact, the decisive factor here is probably 
not whether we are in the continuous or discreet case; it is more 
likely to be the effective rate of moving among satisfied individuals. 
Segregation simply falls as this rate increases and the way this rate is 
implemented as a decision function is of secondary importance. As 
it is implemented, this rate is greater in the continuous case than in 
the discreet case. It is therefore more difficult for the kinetic which is 
favourable to segregation to establish itself in the continuous case.
Finally, there is nothing unexpected about any of these results. 
This is certainly the worst conclusion for someone creating models 
in order to present paradoxes. But from the scientific point of view, 
it is thoroughly satisfactory: the model leads to results which can 
be fully explained to the extent that they present no surprise and 
hide no mystery or paradox due to the intervention of an « Invisible 
Hand » – or « unseen hand », using Schelling’s expression. The final 
segregation is simply the outcome of the law of probability that is 
defined on the basis of the effective intolerance and the effective 
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rate of moving among satisfied individuals compared with dissatis-
fied individuals.
Conclusion
Urban segregation has a large number of political, economic 
and social causes. And even if these causes are not present, history 
plays a major role in slowing change in the urban landscape and 
creating an attachment among residents for their district. This means 
that urban segregation can hardly be explained by a single factor. 
A family’s decision to live in a district is certainly, to a considerable 
extent, determined by household income but also closeness to a good 
school for the children or a reasonable journey time to go to work 
for the parents. In addition to these criteria, we can add closeness 
to grandparents, knowledge of the district, public services such as 
public transport, the presence of a kindergarten, or the liveliness or 
the reputation of a district, etc.
Nevertheless, Schelling’s model was extremely successful 
because it seemed to illustrate perfectly the idea that at a collective 
level we do not always obtain what each person intends individu-
ally. Urban segregation was considered to be an undesired effect 
of moderately racist behaviours. Another point in favour of the 
model was that it appeared at just the right time to explain why 
segregation still existed in societies which were becoming more 
and more tolerant. However, before using this model to diagnose 
these problems, should we not first take account of the limits that 
Schelling himself laid down? Should we not also ask if the model’s 
structural constraints really have as little effect on the observed 
dynamic as Schelling thought or if, on the contrary, they go a long 
way to explain the results? To go even further, are individuals as 
tolerant as the model would seem to indicate? Does the form of the 
checkerboard and the neighbourhood enable individuals to tolerate 
only 34% of neighbours who are different? Or do these mean that 
they wish to belong to the majority? And in this case, is not segrega-
tion a trivial result?
Schelling’s thesis according to which we find ourselves in a 
highly segregated society, even with a moderate level of intolerance 
does not stand up to detailed examination of the answers to the 
above questions. As we have seen, when intolerance is really moder-
ate, segregation is moderate and when intolerance is high, segregation 
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is obviously high – the link between these two variables is quasi-
linear. In this regard, the study of structural constraints confirms that 
there is nothing exceptional about the level of segregation which 
results from Schelling’s game. We cannot state that the tipping point 
towards high segregation occurs at lower levels of intolerance than 
one would expect. While some people are convinced that this model 
gives results which are more than trivial, it is finally due to two 
tautologies that combine to give what, if one looks at it closely, is 
a paralogism: it is true that small demands about one’s neighbours 
create some sort of order; it is also true that if everybody wishes to 
be in the majority it is quite impossible for minorities to coexist 
and segregation is high; but it is not true that segregation does not 
reflect what can be expected from the laws of chance and what each 
individual effectively wishes. Schelling’s model does not allow us 
to conclude that, in general, major ghettoes result from innocent 
decisions.
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